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1  Introduction 
Lately, a lively debate has developed whether the euro-zone’s national economies are drifting 
apart. While it has been observed for quite a while that there has been very little further con-
vergence of inflation rates since the beginning of EMU (ECB 2003), the discussion on eco-
nomic divergence in the euro-zone has reached a new quality in the past couple or years or so. 
With Italy having experienced two recessions since the end of the New-Economy boom in 
2000 and German unemployment having reached levels unknown since the late days of the 
Weimar Republic in the 1930s and the Spanish economy growing rapidly on the back of an 
increasing dangerously looking real estate and construction boom, some commentators have 
even  asked  whether  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  can  survive  the  decade  (Gros 
2005) and whether single countries such as Italy (Roubini 2006) or Spain (Munchau 2006) 
might leave EMU. 
In this debate, it has increasingly been argued that divergence in inflation and divergence in 
economic performance are connected (Lane 2006) and might lead to dangerous imbalances in 
EMU  and  possibly  a  political  backlash  against  European  integration  altogether  (Dul-
lien/Schwarzer 2005). Empirically, the German slump has been going hand in hand with very 
low rates of inflation and even the talk about Germany falling into deflation. The Spanish 
boom, on the other hand, has coincided with annual consumer price increases almost twice as 
high as the average of the euro-area. The divergence of inflation has thus been perceived as 
amplifying regional booms and busts (Enderlein 2004): While high inflation in high-growth-
countries has made investments in fixed  assets and  housing more attractive and has thus 
boosted property markets and construction, low inflation in countries such as Germany has 
made financing-conditions more burdensome, depressed domestic demand and construction 
and has contributed to the travails of regional banking systems. Given both inflation and 
growth trends, the common interest rate of the European Central Bank has been perceived to 
be inappropriate both for fast-growing as well as slow-growing countries. The overall impres-
sion of economic divergence has been underlined by a deterioration of public finances in the 
slow growth countries, notably Italy and Germany. 
However, divergences in growth and inflation do not necessarily mean trouble for a monetary 
union. As the ECB (2003) states correctly, diverging inflation rates might just be a sign of DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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regional  economies  adjusting  toward  equilibrium:  If  countries  have  entered  the  monetary 
union at an over- or undervalued exchange rate, below- or above-average inflation rates over a 
number of years might be required just to bring a region’s real exchange rate to an equilib-
rium. In addition, divergences can just be a sign of a different position in the business cycle. 
The interesting question thus is not whether inflation differs, but whether the differences are 
just a sign of the normal business cycle and a smoothly working adjustment mechanism be-
tween regions or whether they result from structural rigidities which might have serious eco-
nomic consequences in the medium and long run. If, for example, differences in inflation 
stem from labour market institutions which do not allow for a fall of regional wage increases 
below that of the rest of the currency union, a real overvaluation once reached will not be 
corrected anymore. In this case, a region can experience a continuing deterioration of its eco-
nomic structure and might be caught in a permanent low growth trap as it has been witnessed 
in the case of East Germany. 3 
This paper tries to shed some light on this question. It does so by looking at the underlying 
changes of unit labour costs in the euro-area. It examines current levels reached as well as the 
dynamics, both in historical perspective and in comparison with two well-functioning cur-
rency unions, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Unit labour 
costs have been chosen for this comparison because they are arguably the best measure avail-
able for a region’s real appreciations and depreciations in a currency union (remember that 
lasting changes in the real exchange rates between regions in a monetary union can only result 
from different paces in labour cost changes, as the nominal exchange rate has been fixed and 
capital markets are widely integrated). Consumer price indices, in contrast, tend to be dis-
torted by changes in indirect taxes or administered prices. Moreover, they might diverge just 
because consumption habits differ between countries: An oil shock will increase inflation 
more in a country in which people spend a larger part of their income on energy (i.e. because 
they have a larger distance to cover commuting to work), while this does not mean in any way 
a danger to the stability of EMU. 
The implicit argument behind the comparison of unit labour cost trends to historical prece-
dents in the US and Germany is as follows: If regional unit labour cost developments are part 
                                                                        
3 For an excellent exposition how an real overvaluation due to excessive wage increases after the German cur-
rency union and labour market institutions which keep wages from falling again interacted in producing the persis-
tent East German slump, see Snower/Merkl (2006). DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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of a normal adjustment mechanism in a well-functioning currency union, they should not 
deviate more from their long term average than it has been experienced by regions within the 
US or within Germany over the past decades. Moreover, as a higher speed of unit labour cost 
dynamics means that the short-run amplifying effect of the real interest rate on economic 
activity is stronger, regional booms and busts tend to be more pronounced the more dynamic 
unit labour costs change. Thus, if unit labour cost dynamics in EMU countries turn out to be 
faster than in the United States or Germany, this might provide an indication of a higher prob-
ability of disturbing cyclical developments and excesses in parts of EMU. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some theoretical background for de-
termining whether divergences in the euro-area are harmful or not and how to best spot harm-
ful divergences. In section 3, relative nominal unit labour cost indices for the euro-countries 
are constructed. Section 3.3 then looks at the development of these indices in historical per-
spective. It compares the most recent developments with those before the start of European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and tries to draw a conclusion whether recent divergences are exces-
sive by historical standards. Section 3.4 takes a look at the developments of unit labour costs 
between the States (“Länder”) of the Federal Republic of Germany. It presents formerly un-
published estimates for relative unit labour costs of the German Länder from 1970 to 2004 
and compares the trends and adjustments to those in the euro member states. Section 3.5 does 
the same for the 50 US states and the 8 US census regions. It presents newly calculated unit 
labour cost indices for these regions from 1977 to 1997 and compares the trends and stylised 
facts with those in the euro-zone. In both section 3.4 and 3.5, the comparisons are made with 
an emphasis on two features of the time series. First, it is evaluated whether the dynamics of 
relative nominal unit labour costs in single EMU countries since 1998 have any precedents in 
the German Länder or in the US regions. To this end, it is investigated if there have been any 
eight-year-periods during which unit labour costs in part of Germany or of the USA have 
changed as much as in the EMU countries since its beginning. Second, it is checked whether 
the current level of unit labour costs, measured as the deviation from the long-run average, 
has any precedents in Germany or the USA. Section 4 concludes. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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2  How to spot harmful divergences in a monetary union? 
Before measuring divergences in EMU, it is useful to distinguish which types of divergences 
actually pose economic problems, which types are benign and which types might actually be a 
useful and a wanted adjustment mechanism. This section tries to give answers to these ques-
tions. Subsection 2.1 examines in which cases divergences might actually be useful for the 
working of a monetary union. Subsection 2.2 then moves to the question in which cases di-
vergences can cause serious economic problems. Subsection 2.3 explains how harmful diver-
gences can arise in EMU. Figure 1 proposes a graphical classification of divergences, summa-
rising subsections 2.1 to 2.3. 
2.1  Labour cost divergences as part of necessary adjustment 
Divergences in inflation do not necessarily cause harm. Starting from disequilibrium, unit 
labour cost growth rates in single countries must diverge from the rest of a currency union in 
order to reach equilibrium again (i.e. ECB 2003), in a monetary union, inflation and wage 
divergences in fact might be a beneficial phenomenon and might therefore not be a reason for 
concern: If a single country has entered EMU with an exchange rate which is below the long-
run equilibrium exchange rate, it might need an inflation rate above the rest of EMU to reach 
equilibrium. Similarly, if a country has entered EMU at an overvalued exchange rate, it might 
need a below-average rate of inflation to regain competitiveness and again reach its equilib-
rium exchange rate.  
A similar argument can be made if a country is hit by an asymmetric demand shock: If sud-
denly a shift in global preference away from one country’s production occurs, prices for that 
country’s output need to fall in order to prevent a prolonged shortfall of demand over supply 
and thus an increase in unemployment in the country in question. If, on the other hand, global 
demand for a country’s products suddenly and structurally increases, an above-average rate of 
inflation might be warranted in order to bring demand again back into line with supply. In 
both cases one would expect also wages to move in line with inflation. 
In both cases, the adjustment process might run over several years. As prices and wage trends 
tend to be sticky, such an adjustment process can be expected to last for several years rather 
than happen at once. However, neither these divergences nor their persistence need to be DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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reason for concern. Quite the contrary: It should be a reason for concern should these diver-
gences not appear as they are the only way to get a regional economy back to equilibrium 
after an initial misalignment of its exchange rate or after an asymmetric shock. 
Moreover, a divergence of inflation rates might just be a sign of a different position in the 
economic cycle, which by itself does not need to be a problem. After all, regional boom and 
bust cycles have been experienced in the United States of America and been analysed well 
before the beginning of EMU (Krugman 1993). Given decently working labour and product 
markets, inflation differentials should correct themselves in due time: As Arnold/Kool (2003) 
as well as Lane (2006) explain, there are two counterbalancing effects at work in a monetary 
union. The first effect amplifies growth in high inflation areas via a lower real interest rate, 
while the second effect dampens growth in those regions via a real appreciation. Given a 
common nominal interest rate, the real interest rate in regions with high inflation is lower than 
in regions with low inflation. Consequently, demand, credit growth and housing markets in 
these regions are stimulated, again pushing up inflation. At the same time, high inflation re-
gions slowly lose competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the currency area, which in due time 
will dampen extra-regional demand and thus economic growth in the high inflation region. 
While the first effect seems to be the one working much quicker than the second one, the 
second one finally leads to the end of a regional boom or bust cycle (Arnold/Kool 2003). 
2.2  Why and under which circumstances divergences can become a 
problem 
Even for divergences which are not part of the adjustment mechanism and do not fall under 
those examined above, one might argue that they do not pose serious economic problems, as 
long as prices converge back to equilibrium in the long run. Prices in one country would then 
be a little higher than in the rest of the union for a number of years and below the average for 
another number of years. As long as individuals can borrow in financial markets, welfare 
effects should be expected to be small. The phenomenon, one could argue, is a purely nominal 
one, without any real effects. 4 However, there are a number of theoretical arguments to cast 
doubt on this view. Instead, if divergences persist for a prolonged periods, they might cause 
misallocations and even long-term detrimental effects to growth.  
                                                                        
4 This might be true even though Lucas (2003) argues that direct welfare effects from economic fluctuations are 
rather small. See Yellen/Akerlof (2006). DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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First, as an above-average rate of domestic inflation makes finance cheaper while investment 
in the tradable sector becomes less attractive with the loss of competitiveness, it might lead to 
excessive investment in the housing sector. Not only might an excessive amount of capital be 
allocated to this sector which contributes relatively little to long-term productivity growth. In 
addition, there is the danger that workers are lured into construction jobs who might later be 
very hard to retrain once a building boom ends, thus shifting the Beveridge curve outwards 
and increasing structural unemployment. 
Second, persistent deviations in the price trend might lead to a strong overvaluation of one 
country in monetary union. Whereas undervaluation leads to increasing exports and income, 
import prices raise and via a deterioration in the trade balance, adjustment occurs in the long 
run. Adjustment processes might however be asymmetric with regard to speed and intensity, 
due to hysteresis phenonenom: Once trapped in a situation of overvaluation, profits might 
suffer and investment contract, leading to a longer period of sub-trend economic growth until 
the real appreciation is corrected again. These boom-and-bust-periods might not only bring 
about negative welfare effects , but might also lower the potential output of a single country: 
As we know from labour market economics, there are good arguments for hysteresis in the 
labour market, meaning that unemployment is at least to a certain extent path dependent. This 
does  not  necessarily  imply  an  insider/outsider  set-up  as  it  has  been  assumed  by  Blanch-
ard/Summers (1986), but can also be constructed by new-growth-theory considerations of 
human capital accumulation. Saint-Paul (1987) describes the detrimental effects of longer 
stints of unemployment on potential output with the words “unlearning by not doing”: If a 
person is unemployed for an extended period, she would miss out learning new technologies 
and might even lose some basic skills necessary for productive employment.  
In addition, recent research has pointed to the fact that periods of below-trend-growth might 
even lower the rate of technological progress, thus depressing the long-run growth rate of an 
economy. Aghion/Howitt (2005) argue that especially in countries with underdeveloped fi-
nancial markets, firms might not be able to get capital for research and development activit-
ites in a cyclical downturn. Excessive (or long) downward deviations from the trend thus 
lower the economies’ expenditure on R&D which in turn depresses technological progress. 
As Aghion and Howitt point out, this effect can be expected to be larger in EMU countries 
than in the U.S. given the relative underdevelopment of financial markets in Europe.  DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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Finally, political economy arguments hint that prolonged boom-and-bust cycles as a result 
from divergences might actually endanger the political stability of the euro-area: A country 
which finds itself at the beginning of the bust leg of a business cycle amplified by the struc-
ture of EMU might find the idea of leaving monetary union increasingly attractive. Leaving 
the union would allow the country to depreciate sharply and forego the adjustment costs of 
relative wage deflation. If the country’s politicians have a sufficiently high personal discount 
rate, the short-term benefits of leaving EMU might actually be perceived larger than the long-
run costs of the forgone membership in the monetary union such as lower long-term interest 
rates. This might in the end lead to single countries pulling out of EMU. 
All of these negative effects of divergences can be expected to start kicking in as soon as a 
region’s real exchange rate and inflation trend is away from equilibrium. However, they will 
only be sizable if a single country’s real exchange rate has deviated significantly from its 
equilibrium value. 
2.3  Possible reasons for excessive divergences in EMU 
There are a number of arguments why there might be strong divergences in EMU which are 
not part of a normal adjustment mechanism. First, the absence of national monetary policy 
can amplify the national business cycle (Lane 2006, Enderlein 2004), thus leading to a further 
real appreciation when a country already has an overvalued real exchange rate or to a further 
depreciation event though a country’s exchanger rate is already undervalued. As the ECB sets 
its interest rate with reference to the whole EMU, for some EMU countries, the interest rate 
by definition will below what would be optimal for the current position in the business cycle, 
while it will be above the optimum level for other countries. 5 Consequently, if a single coun-
try is finding itself in a stronger cyclical growth position than the rest of EMU, economic 
growth in this country is further amplified as the ECB interest rate is accommodating. The 
opposite is true for a country finding itself with a larger output gap and lower inflation than 
the rest of EMU: In these cases, the common monetary policy might be too restrictive from 
the point of view of the single country, dampening regional growth further. 
Due to this mechanism, relative prices and wages can be depressed or boosted even for coun-
tries which had a real exchange rate in equilibrium to begin with. In principle, this kind of DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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divergence should reverse in due course: With the real appreciation of the booming country, 
external demand should slow after some time while the real depreciation of a country with 
sub-par growth should boost exports. However, empirics seem to point at the fact that the real 
exchange rate effects works much slower than the interest rate channel, leading to long peri-
ods of appreciation even if a country already has an overvalued real exchange rate or long 
periods of depreciation even if a country already is highly competitive. 
While a certain divergence from the equilibrium real exchange rate also happens in a pre-
EMU regime, two facts might thereby cause the real exchange rate to diverge further from its 
equilibrium in a monetary union than in a floating regime: First, in a pre-EMU-regime, the 
national central bank would fight national inflation earlier and harder, breaking wage trends 
before  they  lead  to  large  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate.  Second,  in  a  pre-EMU-
environment, financial markets probably would not put up with very large current account 
deficits, putting a downward pressure on the nominal exchange rate. 
Thus, these cyclical divergences are both a consequence and a cause of amplified business 
cycle in EMU: They stem from the fact that a common monetary policy amplifies booms and 
busts in a monetary union. At the same time, they set the stage for prolonged periods of boom 
and bust as they might force the real exchange rate of a booming country far away from its 
equilibrium, making a longer period of sub-potential growth necessary to correct for the ex-
cessive price and wage increases. 
A second possibility for malign divergences arises, if inflation or wage trends in a single 
country have a high persistence and do not react quickly to a change in aggregate or labour 
demand, it is possible that the regional price level diverges away from equilibrium even if the 
country in question does not show any significant divergence in the position in the business 
cycle. If, for example, wage bargainers in a single country hardly react to an increase in un-
employment due to specific labour market structures, this country might experience a perma-
nent real appreciation, even if it already is in a situation of real overvaluation to begin with. 
Abstracting from cyclical fluctuations, this would lead to a continuing increase in the unem-
ployment  rate  until  labour  market  structures  are  changed  or  the  wage  bargaining  regime 
breaks apart due to endogenous tensions from rising unemployment. Contrary to the cyclical 
                                                                        
5 See Hayo (2006) for an estimate of the deviation of the ECB interest rate from the optimum for a number of 
EMU countries. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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divergences described above, these structural divergences can be expected to have much more 
serious  consequences  as  the  normal  course  of  the  business  cycle  does  not  provide  for  a 
mechanism by which they could be corrected. 
The interesting question is thus how long divergences can still be seen as benign. This paper 
uses historical precedents of other monetary unions which have proved to be stable over sev-
eral decades. Against this background, divergences in EMU should be seen as a reason for 
concern if they fulfil the two criteria of moving the real exchange rate away from its equilib-
rium and are larger than before the beginning of EMU. Moreover, if divergences persist be-
yond the regional business cycle, they can be assumed to be structural. 
Figure 1: Classifying divergences in a monetary union 
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3  Empirical Measurement of Divergences 
In order to spot harmful divergences, an indicator to measure these deviations is needed. At 
first sight, one could think that differences in the national rates consumer price inflation give a 
good indication of divergences in a monetary union. However, there are a number of factors 
which might influence consumer prices but do not have any influence on medium or long 
term competitiveness and are therefore are of little importance to the working of a monetary 
union. First, changes in indirect taxation can push inflation up or down, without actually in-
fluencing national competitiveness as indirect taxes are charged both to imported as well as 
domestically produced goods. The same is true in the case of some social security reforms: 
I.e. when the share of individual co-payments to public health services is increased, measured 
CPI inflation usually rises. 6 However, the increased co-payments again have no significance 
for the competitiveness of a single country in a monetary union. 
Second, CPI inflation is usually strongly influenced by swings in energy prices. As the share 
of energy consumption in the consumer’s basket differs between the countries, changes in 
energy prices might again distort the indices. 
Third, especially in some of the smaller countries with goods markets which are well inte-
grated into the world market (or the neighbouring countries’ markets), underlying changes in 
labour costs and competitiveness might not necessarily show up in headline CPI inflation: If 
consumer prices are to a large extent determined by the neighbouring countries’ price level, 
inflation might not diverge much even if underlying trends deviate from the rest of the union. 
In this case, excessive wage increases and a loss in competitiveness would rather show up in 
falling profits and finally rising unemployment while CPI inflation might remain close the 
trend of the neighbouring countries. 
Thus, a better indicator than CPI inflation seems to be unit labour costs which closely de-
scribe the underlying change of a single countries’ competitiveness. For this reason, this paper 
concentrates on analysing unit labour cost trends. 
                                                                        
6 This was the case when Germany introduced a 10 € fee for visits to a doctor’s office in 20004. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
Empirical Measurement of Divergences 
  12 
3.1  Indices for relative unit labour cost performance 
The analysis of this paper is consequently done using an index of relative nominal unit labour 
costs (RNULC hereafter). For computing the RNULC index for the euro area, the EU com-
mission’s AMECO database’s (fall 2005) time series on nominal unit labour costs for the 
whole economy measured in ECU/Euro has been used (see table Table 2).The RNULC index 
can be interpreted as a real exchange rate index relative to the euro-zone, measured in unit 
labour costs. This index has the value 100 for all countries in the base year 1998. Moreover, it 
has the value 100 for the euro-zone as a whole for the entire time range of the sample. Conse-
quently, the reading for a specific country in a specific year shows how much price competi-
tiveness has improved or deteriorated relative to the base year. For example, a value of 105.5 
for Spain in 2003 shows that Spain’s price competitiveness has deteriorated by 5.5 percent 
since 1998. Germany’s reading for the same year of 95.5 shows that the country’s competi-
tiveness has improved by 4.5 percent. From these values, one can also compute the change in 
the competitiveness position between two given years in a straightforward way by dividing 
the years’ two values: For example, if one wants to find out by how Spanish competitiveness 
has changed from 1993 to 2003, one has to divide the 2003 value of 105.5 by the 1993 value 
of 102.7. Thus, we see that Spain has lost 2.7 percent in price competitiveness between 1993 
and 2003. 
1998 has been chosen as a base year. 1998 turns out to be the first year in which the nominal 
exchange rates of all of the 11 original EMU members have been in the range of plus or mi-
nus less than one percent of their final euro conversion rate. Taking the commission’s stan-
dard base year (1995), on the other hand, might have led to wrong conclusions: From 1995 
until 1998, there have been some cases of quite strong nominal exchange rate movements 
which cannot be attributed to a loss of competitiveness due to a malfunctioning of regional 
labour markets within the monetary union. 7  
Just as the EU commission’s figures on nominal unit labour costs include estimates for 2005 
and forecasts for 2006, the RNULC index also extends to 2006. Even though it is possible that 
developments turn out different from the EU’s commission’s forecast, this paper analysis the 
developments up to 2006. The basic conclusions of this paper would not change much should 
there be a small deviation from the commission’s forecast. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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To judge the developments within the euro-zone against the experiences of the Federal Re-
public of Germany with its single currency (the Mark), a similar RNULC index has been 
computed for the German Länder. The data for this exercise was taken from the web-site of 
the Länder’s network for economic statistics (“Arbeitskreis VGR der Länder”)8. Unit labour 
costs have been computed by dividing the (nominal) compensation for employees by the real 
gross regional product for each of the 11 Länder. In a second step, these numbers were in-
dexed against a pan-German unit labour cost index. As the data for the old federal republic is 
only available until 1990, and from 1991 only data for all of Germany is provided, the refer-
ence shifts from the old Länder until 1990 to pan-Germany from 1991 onwards. Thus, until 
1990, the index shows the relative development of unit labour costs vis-à-vis the old federal 
republic while from 1991 onwards, the index shows the development relative to all of Ger-
many. Just as the index for the EMU countries show that countries’ performance against the 
rest of that currency union (even after it expanded with the joining of Greece in 2001), the 
index for the German Länder shows the relative performance against all of the other Länder. 
1970 is chosen as the base year as it is the first available year in the statistics. The results of 
these computations can be found in Table 3.  
Finally, to draw from the experience of the United States of America, a RNULC index has 
also been constructed for the 50 states of the US States as well as for the 8 census regions. 
The necessary data on gross state products and total compensation of employees has been 
taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ database on regional and state GSP.  9 The 
change from the SIC industrial classification to the NAICS classification in 1997 has created 
a slight problem: As data on employees’ compensations has not been published for the first 
years after the statistical change and have only been resumed in 2001, a RNULC time series 
can only be constructed from 1977 to 1997. However, that still gives us 13 eight-year-periods 
and an overall time-span of about three times that of EMU to compare recent developments in 
the euro-zone to. 
                                                                        
7 For example, the Italian lira has gained back much of the value lost after the 1992 crisis of the European Mone-
tary System in the years 1993 to 1998. 
8 http://www.vgrdl.de 
9 http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/gsp.htm DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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3.2  Standard Measures of the RNULC time series 
Having constructed the RNULC indices, the next step is to find a sensible measure for diver-
gence. Traditional indicators such as the standard deviation or the range do not help much in 
determining whether divergence is reaching dangerous levels: If countries have entered EMU 
at a misaligned exchange rate, their unit labour costs can be expected to diverge over the years 
since, thus leading to a higher standard deviation over time. So would also a divergence away 
from equilibrium. Consequently, both wanted and unwanted divergences could be expected to 
produce the same pattern of standard deviations. Moreover, as the standard deviation de-
scribes the average deviation, it would not react much should only one country diverge in a 
problematic manner.  
A similar argument holds for the range between the highest and lowest relative unit labour 
cost position: If exchange rates prior to EMU have been misaligned badly, one would expect a 
rather large increase in the range in the years since, without this hinting at dangerous devel-
opments. Moreover, a higher range would only point at one single country diverging, not 
showing whether additional countries experience pathological developments. 
Attempts to conduct a more in-depth analysis econometric of the behaviour of RNULC since 
the beginning of EMU such as a cointegration analysis and an error-correction model which 
might hint at the speed with which unit labour costs return to equilibrium and how far they 
have deviated from their fundamental level are doomed to fail as the time series available is 
much to short and will remain so for a number of years. 
This paper thus follows a different approach: First, the levels of RNULC are judged against 
their long term average, both in comparison with historical precedents of pre-EMU times 
when a nominal exchange rate still existed which might have caused adjustment and in com-
parison with the United States and Germany. In addition, the euro-zone data is examined 
whether it shows dynamics after 1998 which are unusual in comparison with other currency 
unions such as Germany and the United States. There is the implicit assumption behind this 
approach that in the very long run, real exchange rates have on average not deviated much 
from their equilibrium value. 10  
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3.3  Euro-Zone developments in historical perspective 
Taking a closer look at the RNULC index for the euro-zone, we see that a small number of 
countries have lost a significant part (more than 7.5 percent) of their original price competi-
tiveness between 1998 and 2006: By this measure, Portugal has appreciated by 16.8 percent, 
Spain by 11.3 percent, Ireland by 10 percent, Luxembourg by 9.3 percent and Italy by 9.4 
percent. Greece has also strongly lost competitiveness. Since the country only joined EMU in 
2001 after repeated nominal depreciations in prior years, the index figure for 2005 even un-
derstates the loss of competitiveness induced by nominal wage increases. From 2001 to 2006, 
the country has lost 12.4 percent of its price competitiveness, more than any other countries in 
this five-year period. 
It is interesting to note that all but two (the exceptions being tiny Luxembourg and Ireland) of 
the countries which have significantly lost competitiveness until 2006, lost competitiveness in 
almost every single year since 1998. This is even more remarkable as Portugal and Italy have 
been underperformers with respect of economic growth in the past years. Had they well-
functioning labour markets, one would have expected that their widening output gaps in 2003 
to 2005 had put downward pressure on labour cost growth. Instead, unit labour costs in these 
two countries continued to rise quicker than in the rest of the euro-zone even though their 
economies were performing markedly worse. This development contrasts with that in the 
Netherlands: The Dutch economy had lost competitiveness from 1998 to 2003 to almost the 
same extent as Spain has from 1998 to 2006. However, as the economy slowed, the trend in 
RNULC turned and the competitive position improved again. In 2006, the Netherlands had 
regained a third of the competitiveness lost in prior years. 
When comparing the current levels of competitiveness to historical relative unit labour cost 
performance, we see that Portugal has the worst competitive position since the beginning of 
the time series. The same is true for Spain, though that country’s competitive position is close 
to that experienced in 1992 just prior to the speculative attacks which pushed its currency out 
of the European Monetary System (EMS). Greece’s competitive position is the worst since 
that country’s end of military dictatorship in 1974 (and long before her joining of European 
Union in 1981). The situation does not look quite as bleak for Italy which is still slightly more 
competitive than it was just prior the EMS crisis in 1992. Ireland’s real exchange rate relative 
to the rest of EMU is still significantly below that of the early 1980s. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
Empirical Measurement of Divergences 
  16 
Moreover, the loss of competitiveness of these countries is unusual even in cross-country 
perspective. Compared to 1998, there have only been a few occasions on which single coun-
tries have been as uncompetitive as Portugal or Spain are now. The Netherlands had lost 
competitiveness to a similar degree in the 1970s which culminated in a deep economic crisis 
in the early 1980s. Ireland had a similarly unfavourable relative unit labour cost position in 
the early 1980s when the country was widely seen to be in deep crisis and unemployment 
stood at double digit rates. Only a strategy of deliberate undervaluation by very low wage 
increases brought this country back into a favourable competitive position. France had a unit 
labour cost position only a little shy of that of Portugal today in the early 80s before major 
alignments in EMS took place in 1982 and 1983.11 
According to the data, there is one single country that has significantly improved price com-
petitiveness since 1998: Germany’s relative unit labour costs have fallen by 8.9 percent from 
1998 to 2006, significantly faster even than in Austria, the country with the second highest 
decrease over the period (6.0 percent). A fall in nominal relative unit labour costs as experi-
enced in Germany has not been at all unusual for EU countries prior to EMU when nominal 
depreciations of single currencies regularly led to large fluctuation in single countries’ com-
petitive positions. For example, Italy gained about 13 percent in price competitiveness in the 
two years after the EMS crisis in 1992 when the lira had dropped out of the exchange rate 
mechanism. However, compared to its long-term relative unit labour cost position, Germany 
appears to be highly competitive in 2006: One has to go back to the late 1960s to find a year 
in which the relative unit labour cost index has been as low as now. 
3.4  Lessons from Germany 
However, a certain divergence in the development might just reflect slightly different  re-
gional cycles or a correction of asymmetric shocks to one or more regions in a currency un-
ion. Thus, the interesting question is whether the divergence observed in the euro-zone can be 
considered as something which is normal in currency unions or whether it is beyond those 
divergences in other monetary union.  
Taking a closer look at the RNULC developments of the German Länder, we find that a dete-
rioration of the competitive position close to what we have seen in Italy, Ireland and Luxem-
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bourg in the eight years up to 2006 has only happened once in one of the German Länder 
excluding Berlin (see Table 5): In Schleswig-Holstein, relative unit labour costs deteriorated 
by 8.8 percent from 1975 to 1983. However, this increase came after a period of gains and 
competitiveness and was followed by a swift correction 1983 onwards. However, the increase 
both in Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg since 1998 has been above this value, thus putting 
them beyond the experience of the larger German Länder. 
A deterioration of the RNULC position even close to that experienced by Spain (11.3 percent) 
or Portugal (16.8 percent) cannot be found in any eight-year-period in any of the German 
Länder excluding Berlin. Only Berlin has experienced a similar deterioration after Reunifica-
tion: As the western part of the city was united in 1990 with its eastern half, relative unit la-
bour costs jumped by almost four percent. One of the reasons was that Eastern German wages 
rose rapidly while productivity was lagging behind. From 1990 to 1998, Berlin’s relative unit 
labour cost position deteriorated by 10.3 percent. However, these data have to be interpreted 
with the historical background in mind: Transport from and to Berlin was very difficult prior 
to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990. Economic activity therefore needed to be heavily subsi-
dised. The increase in labour costs after 1990 thus might only be a compensation for the fall 
in  the  company’s  non-labour  costs.  Moreover,  economic  activity  in  Berlin  today  is  very 
strongly tilted towards public and government services (with the larger part of the federal 
government and a number of lobbyists working in Berlin). For these activities, competitive-
ness is not an issue since these services cannot be substituted by similar services in other 
Länder. The argument would not hold for EMU countries such as Portugal, Spain or Ireland, 
but maybe for Luxembourg: For this country, providing services to the rest of the EU such as 
hosting the European Court of Justice might explain a similar unit labour cost development as 
in Berlin. 
Germany’s performance within the EMU with a decrease in the relative unit labour cost posi-
tion of 8.9 percent from 1998 to 2004 also is extraordinary by the standards set by the German 
Länder: A decrease of unit labour costs close to this magnitude in any given eight-year-period 
has only been observed in the small city state of Hamburg, in the periods starting in 1988 and 
1989. However, even there, relative unit labour costs never fell by more than 8.0 percent over 
any eight-year-period. The maximum decrease for any larger German states (excluding the 
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city states) has been the fall in relative unit labour costs in Hesse by 6.9 percent, in the period 
from 1988 to 1996. 
However, in order to judge whether the divergence of relative unit labour costs in EMU since 
1998 can be considered as normal fluctuation or even a wanted adjustment compared with 
other currency unions, not only the speed of adjustment is important, but also the question 
whether adjustment has moved beyond a level of relative unit labour costs which is sustain-
able. To this end, the long run average of the relative unit labour cost position has been com-
puted both for each EMU country as well as for the German Länder. For the EMU countries, 
the 2006 value has been set into relation with the long-term average since 1980, assuming that 
prior to that date, nationally sheltered markets might make comparison difficult. For the Ger-
man Länder, the maximum deviation above and below the long-term trend have been com-
puted (see bottom part of Table 3). Against this background, the development of unit labour 
costs in Greece, Spain and Portugal looks highly unusual: While for the German Länder, only 
Berlin  experienced  any  deviation  of  more  than  9.3  percent  above  the  long-term  average, 
Spains’s relative unit labour costs in 2006 stood 11.7 percent, Greek unit labour costs 18.1 
percent and Portugal’s relative unit labour costs 28.1 percent above its long-term average. 
Italy’s competitive position, on the other hand, looks rather benign: With only 4.6 percent 
above the long-run-average, this is clearly in the bounds of German Länder precedents. The 
same is true for Ireland, the NULC index standing only 4.1 percent above its average value. 
Germany’s relative unit labour cost position in EMU also does not look extraordinary. With 
6.1 percent below the long-term average, similar developments have been experienced by one 
large German Länder, Hesse and by the city state of Bremen. 
Thus, compared to Germany, unit labour costs in some EMU countries have diverged already 
further than had been the case in any of the German states except Berlin. While the deteriora-
tion of the unit labour cost position of Spain and Portugal are clearly beyond anything experi-
enced in Germany, both Italy’s and Ireland’s real appreciation as well as Germany’s real 
depreciation in unit labour cost terms can be considered to be still close to the Länder prece-
dents. 
3.5  Lessons from the United States 
Another instructive way to gauge the developments of unit labour costs in the Euro-area is a 
comparison with the development in the USA. When looking at the changes in relative unit DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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labour costs over any given eight-year-periods in the United States, at first sight, the variation 
seems to be much larger than in the European Monetary Union, with increases of up to 21 
percent and decreases of up to 35 percent (see Table 6). Closer examination of the data, how-
ever, reveals that much of this variation is due to very distinct developments in one state and 
one territory, namely Alaska and Washington, D.C. While the relative unit labour cost posi-
tion of Alaska is extremely volatile, Washington, D.C. has experienced a continuing increase 
of relative unit labour costs since 1979. Two factors probably explain these developments. 
For Alaska, one reason might be the heavy reliance of the State’s economy on natural re-
sources such as oil or mining which already leads to a very volatile gross state product (with 
several measured GSP increases and decreases in the range of the sample by more than 10 
percent compared to the year before) . The unit labour cost series thus seems to capture more 
of a change in the oil drillers’ rents than in the state’s competitiveness. Moreover, for the 
profitability of oil production, the crude price probably is more important than the variation in 
labour costs. 
For Washington, D.C., a similar argument might hold as for Berlin or Luxembourg: Due to its 
role as national capital, Washington, D.C., provides services to the rest of the country which 
cannot be easily substituted by some other state’s products and which are paid for by transfers 
from the rest of the currency area. Thus, the permanent real appreciation might be conse-
quence of that territory’s special role and of little economic consequence for D.C. 
If we look at the United States excluding Alaska and D.C., the changes in relative unit labour 
costs of some EMU countries again seem quite pronounced. None of the single States in the 
US (except Alaska) has experienced any eight-year-period in which it has experienced an 
increase of unit labour costs even close to Portugal’s 16.8 percent. Spain’s, Ireland’s and 
Italy’s loss of competitiveness is still in the range of US states. The largest increase of unit 
labour costs over any eight-year-period in any US state except Alaska has been experienced in 
Louisiana from 1988 to 1996. Here, relative unit labour costs rose by 12.912 percent , com-
pared to 10 percent in Ireland, 11,3 percent in Spain, or 9.4 percent in Italy. 
Germany’s performance, on the other hand, does not look extraordinary when compared to 
the single US states: The maximum decrease in unit labour costs over an eight-year-period in 
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the US has been 21 percent, experienced in Wyoming from 1982 to 1990, way above Ger-
many’s decrease of 8.9 percent. 
However, one must ask whether one can really compare Germany’s adjustment to that of 
Wyoming. After all, Germany’s share of EMU GDP is roughly 26 percent while Wyoming’s 
share of total US GDP is roughly 0.2 percent, even less than Luxembourg’s share in the 
EMU. Louisiana is tiny not only compared to Spain: Louisiana’s share in US GDP amounts to 
1.6 percent compared to Spain’s 12.2 percent share in EMU. 
In order to gauge how much change in relative labour costs might be reasonable for a larger 
region within a currency area, unit labour costs for the US census regions have been com-
puted using the same regional data set from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as for the state 
data (see Table 8). With a 1997 weight of US GDP of between 3.0 percent (Rocky Moun-
tains) to 21.9 percent (Southeast), these regions roughly compare in relative size in the cur-
rency union to the somewhat larger Euro countries Austria (2.9 percent of EMU GDP), Bel-
gium (3.6 percent), the Netherlands (5.9 percent), Spain (12.2 percent), Italy (17.6 percent), 
France (19.9 percent) and Germany (26.3 percent).  
Compared to the census regions, unit labour cost developments in Spain and Portugal again 
look slightly excessive: Only on one occasion has a single census region experienced a dete-
rioration in its competitive position by more than ten percent over an eight-year-period (see 
Tabelle 9): From 1977 to 1985, unit labour costs in the Southwest rose by 10.9 percent, still 
about 7 percentage points shy of Portugal’s RNULC increase and half a percentage point shy 
of Spain’s RNULC increase 1998. Italy’s and Ireland’s performance looks rather on the bor-
der of the US regional precedents: There has been one eight-year-period when relative unit 
labour costs in the Southwest rose as strongly as in Italy from 1998 to 2006. 
Germany’s performance, on the other hand, looks quite out of bound when compared to the 
US census regions: The maximum decrease in any US census region was 4.5 percent, almost 
three percentage points shy of Germany’s decrease since 1998, following (similarly to the 
German experience) a strong increase in relative unit labour costs in the years before. 
When taking the deviation from the relative long-term competitive position as a reference (see 
bottom of Table 8), developments in Portugal, Spain and Greece again look to have run be-
yond the precedents set by US-states: Excluding Alaska and Washington, D.C., no US state 
has ever experienced a deviation from its long-run competitive position compared to Portu-DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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gal’s or Greece’s. The closest development is that of Wyoming which in 1982 reached a rela-
tive unit labour cost position 15.1 percent above the long-term average, compared to 28.1 
percent in Portugal and to 18.1 percent in Greece in 2006. Spain’s deviation in 2006 with 11.7 
percent above the long-term average still looks close to Wyoming’s precedent. However, one 
has to note that Wyoming rather looks like an outliner in the US. Without tiny Wyoming, the 
largest upside deviation from one single state’s long-term relative unit labour cost position 
has been 9.4 percent, experienced in West Virginia.  
From the US census regions, no single entity has ever experienced the relative unit labour cost 
position deviating more than 3.7 percent above its long-term average. Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Spain look unusual from this point of view. Germany’s experience, in contrast, looks in 
line with that of US census regions: With relative unit labour costs roughly six percent below 
the long-run average, this is well in line with developments experienced in the Southwest of 
the US. 
4  Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the unit labour cost developments of single EMU countries relative 
to the currency area as a whole in order to evaluate whether the divergence since the begin-
ning of EMU can be considered as “normal” when compared to regional developments in 
other currency unions such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA. It has found 
that, while unit labour cost developments seem to be well in line for most EMU countries, a 
handful  of  countries  actually  have  experienced  unusual  developments,  namely  Portugal, 
Spain, and to a lesser extent Greece, Italy and Germany. Table 1 summarises the results. 
The developments since 1998 have been especially unusual for two countries, Portugal and 
Spain. For these countries, not only relative unit labour costs have increased much faster than 
for any of the German Länder (except Berlin), faster than for any continental US state and 
significantly faster than for any US census region. Relative unit labour costs for these coun-
tries have also deviated more from their long-term average than it has been the case for any 
German Länder or any US census region. In the case of Portugal, moreover, no instance could 
be found in which a single US continental state had ever deviated more from its long-term 
average relative unit labour cost position. This hints that the divergence of these two countries 
is unwanted and might pose problems in the future. For Portugal, the divergence might even DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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be structural given that even the harsh recession after 2001 did little to correct the divergence. 
For Spain, it is yet to early to make any conclusions whether the divergence is cyclical or 
structural, given that the country has continuously experienced robust growth up to the pre-
sent. 
Also worrying in international comparison has been the development of relative unit labour 
costs in Greece. While cost dynamics in this country over the past eight years have been still 
in line with dynamics experienced inside Germany or inside the USA, the deviation from the 
long run average now is above that experienced by any German Länder, any US state and any 
US census region. More worrying, the dynamics of relative unit labour costs in Greece since 
1998 has been understated by the country’s late entry to EMU and the nominal depreciation in 
the years prior to EMU membership. This hints that Greece’s divergence is also unwanted. As 
for Spain, however, it seems to early to tell whether this divergence is structural or purely 
cyclical. 
Italy and Ireland seem to be borderline cases: Italy’s unit labour cost position has deteriorated 
faster than that of any German Länder in the sample. Moreover, its level is now further away 
from its long-term average than that of any US census region. However, compared to the 
dynamics in the US census regions and the deviations from the long-term average in Ger-
many, its cost position still looks within the precedents. Ireland is a special case, with the 
dynamics having been very strong in recent years (especially from 2003 to 2006). However, 
Ireland is still comfortably close to its long-term average competitive position, which might 
hint that unit labour cost increases in Ireland have rather been a sign of an adjustment of an 
undervalued euro conversion rate than of pathological developments. 
The development in Germany, the country with the strongest fall in unit labour costs relative 
to the rest of the currency union, on the other hand, cannot yet clearly be judged to be un-
usual. While the dynamics of German unit labour costs has been stronger than in any US 
census region and any larger German Länder in the sample, it still looks reasonably normal 
when compared to the US states. Moreover, compared to the long-run average, the level of 
German competitiveness still seems to be within the range experienced in other currency 
unions. Thus, for Germany, we cannot rule out that the divergence is still a correction of a 
misaligned euro conversion rate. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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Table 1: Unusual Relative Labour Cost Developments in selected EMU countries com-
pared to Germany and the USA 



















Germany  X        X   
Italy  X          X 
Ireland  X           
Spain  X  X    X  X  X 
Portugal  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Greece    X    X    X 
X – no comparable precedent found 
 
Thus, one can conclude that, seven years after the creation of European Monetary Union, unit 
labour cost increases in some countries have been much more pronounced than it has been 
observed in the last decades between regions in Germany or the US. While it is possible that 
factors such a misaligned exchange rate at the beginning of EMU and catch-up growth of the 
countries in question play a role, divergences in single countries already seem to be too large 
to be explained solely by these factors. DEP Discussion Papers. Macroeconomics and Finance Series. 5/2006 
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6  Appendix 
Table 2: Relative Unit Labour Costs in the Euro-Zone, 1998=100 



























1980  100,0  106,6  96,9  75,5  96,3  114,0  109,1  90,9  117,5  113,4  90,4  73,4  100,8 
1981  100,0  101,8  93,8  87,1  97,4  113,9  111,6  96,0  116,4  106,9  90,8  82,6  113,3 
1982  100,0  91,9  95,8  97,2  96,0  110,2  115,8  98,5  105,2  110,0  91,5  78,6  115,0 
1983  100,0  90,6  96,7  96,2  86,4  107,9  118,6  106,4  102,6  108,3  92,1  71,8  112,6 
1984  100,0  91,3  95,1  96,5  88,7  107,6  117,0  109,0  100,1  102,0  94,3  71,6  121,9 
1985  100,0  92,5  93,9  94,5  88,8  109,4  118,4  108,6  100,2  99,8  94,5  73,4  126,8 
1986  100,0  93,1  96,9  78,0  86,9  107,3  116,8  108,9  96,4  101,2  97,9  70,7  119,9 
1987  100,0  92,3  99,2  75,7  86,6  104,1  108,7  108,9  97,8  102,6  99,7  68,3  118,9 
1988  100,0  89,9  98,3  81,7  93,7  102,3  110,2  110,1  94,3  101,0  98,6  69,5  126,5 
1989  100,0  90,1  95,6  88,0  101,2  100,8  106,4  114,6  93,1  95,7  97,4  72,5  135,8 
1990  100,0  91,3  93,4  88,6  106,5  100,2  102,9  117,8  93,6  93,3  95,5  76,8  136,9 
1991  100,0  92,8  92,6  82,7  111,2  97,4  100,6  120,8  90,6  92,5  95,2  86,7  136,0 
1992  100,0  93,1  95,6  80,9  111,8  96,0  101,4  115,6  94,3  93,8  95,8  95,8  110,2 
1993  100,0  98,4  101,2  82,1  102,7  99,5  98,5  100,4  98,2  98,5  101,5  92,2  89,6 
1994  100,0  101,4  102,4  85,1  97,4  100,1  99,3  96,7  103,3  99,6  103,8  91,7  95,4 
1995  100,0  103,3  105,7  89,0  96,2  100,2  92,9  86,7  107,3  101,4  106,4  92,5  104,3 
1996  100,0  100,2  102,0  91,8  98,7  100,2  93,6  97,5  104,7  98,5  101,2  94,8  100,6 
1997  100,0  99,1  99,8  100,5  98,2  99,8  100,2  102,9  100,7  98,2  99,7  98,1  100,0 
1998  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
1999  100,0  100,6  99,5  102,7  100,9  99,7  98,3  100,0  99,9  101,0  99,1  110,2  100,2 
2000  100,0  99,6  98,9  99,5  102,4  99,6  100,6  100,6  100,2  102,9  97,7  112,9  99,9 
2001  100,0  101,4  97,8  96,8  103,6  99,5  102,6  101,6  106,1  106,1  96,7  108,6  102,9 
2002  100,0  101,4  96,4  100,5  104,4  99,9  101,1  102,7  108,1  108,8  95,4  110,6  101,2 
2003  100,0  100,3  95,5  99,9  105,5  99,7  102,3  104,8  107,2  110,3  94,3  112,3  99,5 
2004  100,0  99,7  94,0  103,6  107,6  99,6  105,8  106,5  107,1  109,4  93,7  113,5  99,6 
2005  100,0  100,3  92,5  106,2  109,1  99,8  109,0  108,7  108,2  108,3  93,5  115,2  100,7 
2006  100,0  100,6  91,1  108,8  111,3  100,1  110,0  109,4  109,3  106,8  94,0  116,8  99,8 
                           
Min  100,0  89,9  91,1  75,5  86,4  96,0  92,9  86,7  90,6  92,5  90,4  68,3  89,6 
Max  100,0  106,6  105,7  108,8  111,8  114,0  118,6  120,8  117,5  113,4  106,4  116,8  136,9 
Ave.  100,0  97,2  97,1  92,2  99,6  102,5  105,6  104,6  102,3  102,6  96,7  91,1  109,9 
2006  in 
%  of 
average 
100,0  103,5  93,9  118,1  111,7  97,6  104,1  104,6  106,8  104,1  97,3  128,1  90,8 
1 including linked German series; 
2 linked series 
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1970  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1971  99.0  98.8  101.2  102.5  99.9  100.1  99.8  100.9  100.6  99.1  99.9  100.0 
1972  97.3  99.4  101.6  103.0  100.6  99.8  100.2  101.4  99.9  100.2  99.2  100.0 
1973  97.8  100.5  100.7  102.6  99.6  99.4  99.5  100.9  100.8  100.6  99.2  100.0 
1974  99.1  101.4  100.5  103.5  97.9  98.6  100.4  100.3  100.1  97.7  98.3  100.0 
1975  98.3  100.3  98.3  103.5  98.6  98.4  99.2  101.9  101.7  97.8  97.1  100.0 
1976  98.3  100.3  97.8  103.3  98.9  97.4  98.0  102.6  101.5  98.4  98.0  100.0 
1977  97.5  99.4  97.0  102.6  98.6  96.5  98.4  103.7  101.7  101.5  97.7  100.0 
1978  98.3  99.0  98.6  102.9  98.2  95.7  97.9  103.6  102.4  99.6  99.0  100.0 
1979  98.9  98.7  99.1  102.9  95.8  95.6  98.5  103.2  102.8  99.3  100.8  100.0 
1980  99.3  98.7  97.4  99.5  97.1  94.2  98.1  103.8  102.5  98.9  101.5  100.0 
1981  98.7  97.9  97.6  98.6  96.9  95.5  98.5  104.0  101.7  97.1  104.9  100.0 
1982  99.4  97.2  96.5  100.4  98.6  94.6  98.1  104.6  100.0  97.8  104.9  100.0 
1983  99.3  97.2  96.7  102.4  98.0  93.4  98.1  105.0  100.2  97.9  105.6  100.0 
1984  99.9  97.2  96.7  101.6  95.0  93.2  96.8  105.8  100.6  97.6  104.3  100.0 
1985  99.6  97.7  96.8  103.7  94.3  93.2  96.9  105.5  101.2  97.1  104.3  100.0 
1986  99.3  97.7  97.7  104.2  94.6  93.5  97.7  105.7  99.9  96.8  101.7  100.0 
1987  99.0  97.1  97.1  102.4  96.2  92.6  98.2  106.3  100.6  96.0  101.7  100.0 
1988  98.5  97.1  97.8  101.9  96.9  91.9  98.2  106.5  101.3  96.1  102.1  100.0 
1989  98.3  97.5  98.0  102.2  96.1  91.0  97.2  106.9  102.4  95.1  103.3  100.0 
1990  98.4  97.9  98.6  99.9  94.2  90.0  97.3  107.4  102.9  95.9  101.3  100.0 
1991  96.7  95.0  102.4  98.8  92.7  87.3  94.3  105.9  101.9  94.7  100.7  100.0 
1992  96.7  94.8  102.2  98.5  92.4  87.0  94.0  105.3  102.8  95.4  100.3  100.0 
1993  97.7  95.5  102.1  99.4  90.8  86.9  93.8  105.3  103.3  97.3  99.9  100.0 
1994  97.5  95.7  103.4  98.4  91.6  87.5  93.3  105.1  103.7  96.5  100.7  100.0 
1995  96.9  95.6  103.5  97.0  89.7  86.6  95.0  104.2  103.8  95.1  100.3  100.0 
1996  96.9  95.1  105.2  97.1  89.3  85.6  95.7  105.1  105.3  98.3  100.6  100.0 
1997  97.1  95.1  107.2  96.6  88.5  85.1  96.1  105.6  105.1  98.2  100.5  100.0 
1998  96.6  94.6  108.8  95.5  87.7  85.1  95.5  106.0  106.5  99.5  100.5  100.0 
1999  96.8  94.5  109.9  95.1  87.6  84.1  95.9  106.6  105.2  100.0  101.0  100.0 
2000  97.9  93.3  110.2  93.2  86.4  83.6  97.2  107.8  105.8  101.3  100.8  100.0 
2001  97.6  94.3  110.8  93.9  85.6  83.8  98.0  107.2  108.1  100.8  100.4  100.0 
2002  99.4  93.4  111.3  93.2  84.0  85.4  99.0  106.5  107.0  100.1  100.9  100.0 
2003  99.8  93.2  112.1  95.1  84.7  85.9  98.7  106.3  107.1  100.8  100.4  100.0 
2004  100.0  93.4  112.7  95.5  84.7  85.5  98.7  106.6  106.9  101.3  99.6  100.0 
                         
Min  96.6  93.3  96.5  93.2  86.4  83.6  93.3  100.0  99.9  94.7  97.1  100.0 
Max  100.0  101.4  110.2  104.2  100.6  100.1  100.4  107.8  106.5  101.5  105.6  100.0 
Average  98.2  97.4  100.7  100.4  94.9  92.4  97.3  104.4  102.2  98.0  101.0  100.0 
                         
Min  as  % 
of average  98.3  96.1  94.6  93.5  89.6  91.3  95.7  95.5  97.2  96.3  96.2  100.0 
Max  as  % 
of average  101.7  104.5  110.6  104.5  107.3  109.3  103.0  103.0  105.1  103.3  104.7  100.0 
1Up to 1990: The old Länder; from 1991: Old and new Länder 
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Table 2: Change in relative labour unit cost position relative to all of Germany in the eight 
years following the base year (negative values denote improvement of competitiveness) in 
% 
 






























1970  -1.7  -1.0  -1.4  2.9  -1.8  -4.3  -2.1  3.6  2.4  -0.4  -1.0 
1971  -0.1  -0.2  -2.1  0.4  -4.1  -4.5  -1.3  2.3  2.2  0.3  0.9 
1972  2.1  -0.7  -4.1  -3.4  -3.5  -5.6  -2.1  2.4  2.6  -1.3  2.3 
1973  0.8  -2.6  -3.0  -3.9  -2.8  -3.9  -1.0  3.0  0.8  -3.5  5.8 
1974  0.3  -4.1  -4.1  -3.0  0.6  -4.1  -2.3  4.2  -0.1  0.1  6.7 
1975  1.0  -3.0  -1.6  -1.1  -0.7  -5.1  -1.2  3.0  -1.5  0.1  8.8 
1976  1.7  -3.1  -1.1  -1.7  -4.0  -4.3  -1.2  3.1  -0.8  -0.8  6.4 
1977  2.2  -1.8  -0.2  1.0  -4.3  -3.4  -1.6  1.8  -0.5  -4.3  6.7 
1978  1.1  -1.4  -0.9  1.3  -3.6  -2.3  -0.3  2.0  -2.4  -2.8  2.7 
1979  0.1  -1.6  -1.9  -0.4  0.5  -3.1  -0.4  3.0  -2.2  -3.3  0.9 
1980  -0.8  -1.6  0.4  2.4  -0.2  -2.4  0.1  2.7  -1.2  -2.8  0.6 
1981  -0.3  -0.4  0.4  3.7  -0.7  -4.7  -1.3  2.8  0.7  -2.1  -1.5 
1982  -1.0  0.8  2.2  -0.5  -4.4  -4.8  -0.9  2.7  2.9  -2.0  -3.5 
1983  -2.6  -2.3  5.9  -3.5  -5.4  -6.6  -3.8  0.9  1.7  -3.3  -4.6 
1984  -3.2  -2.5  5.7  -3.0  -2.7  -6.7  -2.9  -0.5  2.1  -2.2  -3.9 
1985  -1.9  -2.2  5.5  -4.1  -3.8  -6.7  -3.2  -0.2  2.1  0.2  -4.2 
1986  -1.9  -2.0  5.8  -5.6  -3.2  -6.5  -4.5  -0.6  3.8  -0.4  -1.0 
1987  -2.1  -1.5  6.5  -5.3  -6.8  -6.5  -3.2  -2.0  3.2  -1.0  -1.4 
1988  -1.6  -2.1  7.6  -4.6  -7.8  -6.9  -2.5  -1.4  3.9  2.3  -1.5 
1989  -1.3  -2.4  9.4  -5.5  -8.0  -6.5  -1.1  -1.2  2.7  3.3  -2.7 
1990  -1.8  -3.4  10.3  -4.4  -6.9  -5.5  -1.8  -1.4  3.5  3.7  -0.8 
1991  0.1  -0.5  7.4  -3.8  -5.4  -3.6  1.7  0.6  3.2  5.7  0.2 
1992  1.2  -1.5  7.8  -5.4  -6.5  -3.9  3.5  2.4  3.0  6.2  0.5 
1993  -0.1  -1.3  8.5  -5.5  -5.7  -3.7  4.5  1.7  4.6  3.7  0.5 
1994  2.0  -2.4  7.7  -5.3  -8.3  -2.3  6.2  1.4  3.2  3.8  0.2 
1995  3.1  -2.5  8.3  -2.0  -5.6  -0.8  3.9  2.0  3.1  6.1  0.1 
1996  3.2  -1.8  7.2  -1.7  -5.2  -0.2  3.1  1.4  1.6  3.1  -1.0 
                       
Min  -3.2  -3.4  -4.1  -5.5  -8.3  -6.9  -4.5  -2.0  -2.4  -4.3  -4.6 
Max  3.2  -0.2  10.3  2.9  0.6  -0.2  6.2  3.6  3.9  6.2  8.8 
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Table 3: Maximum increases and decreases in relative unit labour costs over eight-year-
periods for the German Länder in % 
 





























Land with maximum in-
crease 
  Including Berlin  Excluding Berlin     
1970  -4.3  3.6  -4.3  3.6  Hesse  North Rhine-Westphalia  
1971  -4.5  2.3  -4.5  2.3  Hesse  North Rhine-Westphalia 
1972  -5.6  2.6  -5.6  2.6  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1973  -3.9  5.8  -3.9  5.8  Hesse  Schleswig-Holstein 
1974  -4.1  6.7  -4.1  6.7  Hesse/Berlin  Schleswig-Holstein 
1975  -5.1  8.8  -5.1  8.8  Hesse  Schleswig-Holstein 
1976  -4.3  6.4  -4.3  6.4  Hesse  Schleswig-Holstein 
1977  -4.3  6.7  -4.3  6.7  Hamburg  Schleswig-Holstein 
1978  -3.6  2.7  -3.6  2.7  Hamburg  Schleswig-Holstein 
1979  -3.3  3.0  -3.3  3.0  Saarland  North Rhine-Westphalia 
1980  -2.8  2.7  -2.8  2.7  Saarland  North Rhine-Westphalia 
1981  -4.7  3.7  -4.7  3.7  Hesse  Bremen 
1982  -4.8  2.9  -4.8  2.9  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1983  -6.6  5.9  -6.6  1.7  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1984  -6.7  5.7  -6.7  2.1  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1985  -6.7  5.5  -6.7  2.1  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1986  -6.5  5.8  -6.5  3.8  Hesse  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1987  -6.8  6.5  -6.8  3.2  Hamburg  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1988  -7.8  7.6  -7.8  3.9  Hamburg  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1989  -8.0  9.4  -8.0  3.3  Hamburg  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1990  -6.9  10.3  -6.9  3.7  Hamburg  Saarland 
1991  -5.4  7.4  -5.4  5.7  Hamburg  Saarland 
1992  -6.5  7.8  -6.5  6.2  Hamburg  Saarland 
1993  -5.7  8.5  -5.7  4.6  Hamburg  Rhineland-Palatinate 
1994  -8.3  7.7  -8.3  6.2  Hamburg  Saarland 
1995  -5.6  8.3  -5.6  6.1  Hamburg  Saarland 
1996  -5.2  7.2  -5.2  3.2  Hamburg  Baden-Wuerttemberg 
             
Max  -8,0  10,3  -8,0  8,8     
Memorandum: relative unit labour cost changes 1998-2006     
Italy  9.4     
Spain  11.3     
Portugal  16.8     
Germany  -8.9     
Greece  8.8     
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Table 4: Maximum increases and decreases in relative unit labour costs over eight-year-
periods for the US States in % 
 




























State with maximum 
decrease 
State with maximum  
increase 
  Including Alaska & 
Washington, D.C. 
Excluding Alaska & 
Washington, D.C. 
Excluding Alaska & Washington, D.C. 
1977  -35.0  12,5  -6,9  12,5  Iowa  Texas 
1978  -10.3  12,3  -8,2  9,1  West Virginia  New Mexico 
1979  -21.7  14,7  -14,4  7,0  Wyoming  New Mexico 
1980  -15.6  16,9  -15,6  11,3  Wyoming  New Mexico 
1981  -19.1  14,6  -19,1  12,3  Wyoming  North Dakota 
1982  -21.8  12,3  -21,8  6,4  Wyoming  North Dakota 
1983  -18.5  15,1  -18,5  5,5  Wyoming  Michigan 
1984  -13.8  13,0  -13,8  6,5  Wyoming  Michigan 
1985  -14.3  14,5  -14,3  9,3  Wyoming  North Dakota 
1986  -14.6  12,2  -14,6  6,8  New Mexico  Louisiana 
1987  -12.6  23,1  -12,6  8,0  New Mexico  Montana 
1988  -15.6  21,5  -15,6  12,9  New Mexico  Louisiana 
1989  -19.2  17,0  -19,2  12,9  New Mexico  Louisiana 
             
Max  -35.0  23,1  -21,8  12,9     
Memorandum: relative unit labour cost changes 1998-2006     
Italy  9.4     
Spain  11.3     
Portugal  16.8     
Germany  -8.9     
Greece  8.8     
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Table 5: Different Measures of Relative Unit Labour Cost Developments in the 50 US 
States and Washington, D.C. 



















as  %  of 
average 
Minimum 
as  %  of 
average. 
Alabama  2.4  -2.3  100.0  96.3  98.4  101.6  97.8 
Alaska  23.1  -35.0  100.0  57.9  70.9  141.1  81.7 
Arizona  4.5  -4.8  105.7  100.0  102.6  103.0  97.5 
Arkansas  3.0  -1.8  102.7  99.2  100.5  102.2  98.8 
California  0.4  -2.4  101.0  97.4  99.3  101.7  98.1 
Colorado  7.0  -1.4  107.6  100.0  105.0  102.4  95.2 
Connecticut  -0.5  -3.8  100.5  95.0  98.2  102.3  96.7 
Delaware  1.0  -7.7  103.7  90.5  96.6  107.3  93.7 
District  of  Co-
lumbia 
16.9  10.0  130.4  97.9  112.9  115.5  86.7 
Florida  6.7  1.6  107.6  98.1  102.8  104.7  95.4 
Georgia  1.2  -3.1  100.0  96.0  97.9  102.2  98.1 
Hawaii  6.0  -0.1  104.9  96.0  100.9  104.0  95.1 
Idaho  2.4  -4.1  100.0  91.4  95.2  105.1  96.1 
Illinois  1.4  -4.1  100.0  95.6  97.1  103.0  98.5 
Indiana  -0.4  -3.8  101.1  94.6  97.7  103.5  96.9 
Iowa  3.8  -6.9  100.0  92.4  95.6  104.7  96.7 
Kansas  6.2  -1.3  108.0  100.0  103.7  104.1  96.4 
Kentucky  1.3  -2.4  102.3  97.5  100.0  102.3  97.5 
Louisiana  12.9  -13.9  119.0  99.5  109.1  109.0  91.2 
Maine  2.8  -3.5  101.4  97.8  100.0  101.4  97.8 
Maryland  5.1  -0.6  105.9  98.7  101.0  104.9  97.7 
Massachusetts  1.1  -2.0  100.0  97.0  97.9  102.2  99.1 
Michigan  6.5  -3.4  105.4  97.7  102.0  103.3  95.8 
Minnesota  6.1  -2.1  104.6  98.0  101.1  103.4  96.9 
Mississippi  4.0  -5.8  102.3  95.1  99.4  102.9  95.7 
Missouri  1.7  -0.7  102.8  98.9  100.5  102.3  98.3 
Montana  8.0  -4.1  107.6  97.8  101.4  106.1  96.4 
Nebraska  2.3  -4.7  100.0  92.7  96.2  103.9  96.4 
Nevada  3.2  -1.5  105.3  100.0  103.3  102.0  96.8 
New Hampshire  -1.5  -8.0  100.0  86.5  93.7  106.8  92.4 
New Jersey  -0.3  -3.4  100.0  94.6  96.9  103.2  97.6 
New Mexico  11.3  -19.2  114.4  91.6  105.0  109.0  87.2 
New York  5.5  0.4  103.0  96.5  100.5  102.4  96.0 
North Carolina  3.0  -1.0  103.0  98.5  100.8  102.2  97.7 
North Dakota  12.3  -5.5  108.6  91.8  100.4  108.1  91.4 
Ohio  0.6  -5.1  100.5  93.6  96.8  103.9  96.7 
Oklahoma  7.2  -4.4  111.2  100.0  106.9  104.1  93.6 
Oregon  3.3  -5.6  103.4  97.1  101.3  102.1  95.9 
Pennsylvania  -0.5  -4.3  100.0  93.7  96.3  103.9  97.3 
Rhode Island  -0.4  -4.0  100.9  94.2  97.5  103.5  96.6 
South Carolina  -3.4  -5.5  100.0  88.8  93.6  106.8  94.8 
South Dakota  5.7  -6.5  100.8  93.2  97.4  103.5  95.8 
Tennessee  2.3  -2.4  100.6  96.5  98.2  102.4  98.2 
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Utah  3.9  -1.6  102.8  98.4  101.0  101.8  97.5 
Vermont  1.0  -5.4  100.0  91.5  95.1  105.1  96.2 
Virginia  7.1  0.3  108.5  99.5  104.2  104.1  95.4 
Washington  8.0  -2.1  108.9  99.4  102.2  106.5  97.3 
West Virginia  -1.9  -11.6  102.9  87.0  94.0  109.4  92.5 
Wisconsin  2.5  -5.8  101.2  95.4  97.9  103.4  97.4 
Wyoming  1.8  -21.8  110.3  86.2  95.8  115.1  90.0 
               
Maximum  16.9    130.4    112.9  141.1   
Minimum    -35.0    57.9      70.9 
Max. (without AK 
& DC) 
12.9    119.0    109.1  115.1   
Min.  (without  AK 
& DC) 
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Table 6: Relative Nominal Unit Labour Costs in the US Census Regions, 1977=100 
 
  New 
England 











1977  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100 
1978  99.4  98.8  100.6  99.9  100.1  102.5  100.1  99.9  100 
1979  98.7  97.7  100.6  99.7  100.2  104.9  100.9  100.4  100 
1980  98.3  97.9  100.5  100.6  100.2  106.8  100.2  99.7  100 
1981  98.1  98.3  99.3  98.2  100.5  109.9  102.1  99.8  100 
1982  97.9  98.4  98.8  98.2  101.0  111.2  103.1  99.1  100 
1983  98.1  98.2  97.3  100.0  101.1  111.5  103.6  99.5  100 
1984  98.5  98.5  96.5  99.0  101.6  111.6  104.1  99.5  100 
1985  98.1  99.1  96.6  98.5  101.6  110.9  103.6  99.4  100 
1986  97.5  99.2  96.7  99.1  101.3  110.6  103.8  99.3  100 
1987  97.3  99.2  97.1  99.4  101.4  110.7  102.4  98.8  100 
1988  97.8  99.2  97.7  100.1  101.7  108.0  102.4  98.7  100 
1989  97.7  99.6  97.4  99.8  102.0  107.9  102.8  98.3  100 
1990  97.3  99.4  97.8  100.3  102.5  108.1  102.7  97.7  100 
1991  96.5  99.3  98.1  100.0  102.1  108.6  103.7  98.3  100 
1992  96.3  99.3  97.6  100.0  102.6  107.3  103.7  98.7  100 
1993  97.1  99.5  97.9  101.9  102.4  106.2  103.1  98.2  100 
1994  97.0  100.2  97.5  101.0  102.0  105.7  103.5  98.8  100 
1995  96.4  100.0  98.1  101.8  102.0  106.0  103.2  98.4  100 
1996  96.5  100.2  97.6  101.1  102.5  105.8  103.6  98.4  100 
1997  96.4  100.4  97.1  100.9  102.9  105.2  104.3  98.8  100 
                   
Max  106.0  101.6  109.6  101.6  98.3  98.6  100.6  99.8   
Min  102.1  99.0  105.1  98.0  95.6  88.4  96.5  97.2   
Average  103.5  100.4  106.9  99.8  97.0  95.1  99.1  98.5   
Max  as  % 
of average 
102.4  101.2  102.5  101.9  101.3  103.7  101.6  101.3   
Min  as  % 
of average 
98.6  98.6  98.3  98.2  98.5  92.9  97.4  98.7   
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Tabelle 7: Change in relative labour unit cost position of US census regions relative to all 
of the USA in the eight years following the base year (negative values denote improvement 






Mideast  Great 
Lakes 




1977  -1,9  -0,9  -3,4  -1,5  1,6  10,9  3,6  -0,6 
1978  -1,8  0,4  -3,8  -0,8  1,2  7,9  3,7  -0,6 
1979  -1,5  1,5  -3,5  -0,3  1,3  5,5  1,5  -1,6 
1980  -0,5  1,3  -2,8  -0,5  1,4  1,2  2,3  -1,0 
1981  -0,4  1,4  -1,9  1,6  1,5  -1,8  0,7  -1,5 
1982  -0,6  1,1  -1,1  2,2  1,6  -2,7  -0,4  -1,4 
1983  -1,6  1,1  0,8  0,0  1,0  -2,6  0,2  -1,2 
1984  -2,2  0,9  1,1  1,0  1,0  -3,8  -0,3  -0,8 
1985  -0,9  0,3  1,3  3,4  0,8  -4,2  -0,5  -1,1 
1986  -0,6  1,0  0,8  1,9  0,7  -4,5  -0,3  -0,5 
1987  -0,9  0,8  1,0  2,4  0,6  -4,3  0,7  -0,4 
1988  -1,4  1,1  -0,1  1,0  0,8  -2,1  1,1  -0,3 
1989  -1,4  0,7  -0,4  1,0  0,9  -2,4  1,5  0,5 
                 
Min  -2,2  -0,9  -3,8  -1,5  0,6  -4,5  -0,5  -1,6 
Max  -0,4  1,5  1,3  3,4  1,6  10,9  3,7  0,5 
 
 